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NINTH GROUND FOR DIVORCE: ADDENDUM
W. KENDALL LiPsCOMB, JR.
Since the writing of "Ninth Ground For Divorce", I section
20-91, Code of Virginia, relating to grounds for divorce from
the bond of matrimony, has been amended. The article was
written and prepared for publication in January and February,
1962, and the amendment was not approved until March 30,
1962.2
Subsection (9) of § 20-91, as amended in 1962, reads as fol-
lows:
On application of either party if and when the husband
and wife have lived separate and apart without any cohabi-
tation and without interruption for three years. A plea of
res adjudicata or of recrimination with respect to any other
provision of this section shall not be a bar to either party
obtaining a divorce on this ground.
The 1962 amendment changed subsection (9) by deleting
the latter part of the first sentence which read "and at the time
of separation were each resident and domiciled in Virginia."
It also substitued the present second sentence for the prior
second sentence, which read: "Divorce on this ground shall
not be granted where service of process is by publication."
The amendment made the following changes relative to the
grounds for divorce for statutory separation: (1) It is no
longer necessary for the parties to have been each resident and
domiciled in this state at the time of their separation; (2) Res
Adjudicaa with respect to any of the other eight grounds in
this section, is not a bar as to either party; (3) Recrimination,
with respect to any of the other eight grounds, is not a bar to
either party; and (4) Such a divorce may now be granted on
service of process by publication, if such service is otherwise
proper. All four of these changes make it easier to obtain a
divorce by a continuous separation for three years.
I Note, Ninth Ground for Divorce: Statutory Separation for Three Years, 3 William
and Mary L. Rev., 311 (1962).
2 Acts of Assembly, 1962, c. 288, pp. 413, 414.
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Although the amendment substantially liberalized the
statute, it did not materially affect the subject matter of the
previous article, which dealt primarily with the purpose of such
statutes and the nature of the separation required under such
statute. Only the change in the amendment relative to the
defense of recrimination was dealt with in the previous article,
and in that regard it concluded, "Virginia should not consider
fault of the applicant in reaching its decision. The majority of
the jurisdictions do not, and of those which do many are
forced to do so because of the wording of their statutes. * * *
Virginia's statute has no such expressed restrictions."3 Now
Virginia's statute expressly states the law in accord with this
recommended interpretation of the former statute and says
that there is to be no consideration of the fault of either party
in obtaining a divorce under this ground.
As yet, there are no Virginia cases interpreting either the
original statute of 1960 or its 1962 amendment. There is only
one case which even mentions this ground for divorce.4 The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, upon remanding a case
which had been brought on the grounds of cruelty and de-
sertion stated that the litigants should be allowed to amend
their pleadings in view of the creation of a grounds for statutory
separation in 1960.
3 Supra, note 1, at p. 315.
4 Todd v. Todd, 202 Va. 133, 141, 115 S.E.2d 905.
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